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REVIEWS
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond and by this proclama
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited.
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed'
list should contact the Editor.
I

Stephen R. L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast: Are
Animals Moral? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982,
vii + 127 pp., f7.95
We are animals, of a sort, even
though we may sometimes lose sight of
this fact.
The subtitle, therefore,
should not lead us to suppose that the
book is about the morality of nonhu
man animals only. Dr. Clark philoso
phizes against an ethological back
ground, endeavouring to relate the
morality of both humans and nonhu
mans to our biological nature and evo
Iutiona ry legacy. He adopts a revi sed
but
basically
Aristotelian
ethical
stance, holding that morality is ulti
mately grounded in· the sort of being
one is with one's inherent ends. Yet,
while ethology and sociobiology can
shed considerable light on what sort
of beings we are, they cannot provide
a moral system or definitive moral
conclusions.
The fact that a given
gene or form of behaviou r has evolved
does not mean that it is morally
superior.
The best we can hope for
is "that the whole natu ral system has
been made [by God] in such a way
that evol utiona ry logic wi II lead to
creatures of a moral kind" (p. 103).
Clark begins by criticizing the too
atomistic and abstracted approach of
much of modern science, advocating
that we make wider
use of an

Aristotelian
approach.
I nstead of
being
concerned
exclusively
with
abstract ideal models, which particu
larize things and artificially tear them
from the sur ro un din g s of w hi c h they
are necessarily a part, we must turn
to observation of real things in their
natural whole environment. Biological
complexity is such that ideal models
can tell us little about real beings.
Moreover,
he argues against the
behaviou rist dogma. that we must
never attempt to understand animals
in terms of emotions and intentions.
Sometimes this gives us the greatest
overall understanding of what is going
on. To be sure, there is the stand
ing problem that an understanding in
terms of emotions and intentions may
be as misleading as other sorts of
models. This is not a problem we can
resolve by denying the reality from
wh ich it spri ngs.
We ca n not ade
quately understand humans or beasts
if we repudiate any understanding of
thei r inner life.
The author goes on to consider
such topics as intelligence and lan
guage, freedom and necessity, me and
mine (focusing on self-awaremess),
altruism,
sexuality,
parenthood,
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territory and dominance, ending with
a discussion of moral issues and his
conclusions.
One of the conclusions
reached is that beasts a re ethical
since "they respond to aspects of a
situation and to features of their kin,..
dred, that a good man also would
respect. But they are not moral: for
they do not ... moralize ... or construct
intellectua I
systems ... '
(p.
107) .
Certainly some animals sometimes act
from motivations which are morally
relevant and appropriate, though they
do not construct to comprehend ethical
systems. (While agreeing with Clark's
conclusion, I would prefer to revise
the terminology and say that beasts
sometimes act as moral agents but .are
not aware of moral principle.) Lack
ing human levels of self-awareness,
rationality, and freedom, nonhuman
animals are not only unmoved by moral
principle, they have a much narr,ower
range of eth.i:callysignificant options.
With both ,humans and beasts, our
ethical or moral motivations are only a
paTt ·ofou,r bei,ng and must be under
stood in terms of the whole individuail.
It is argued, that much of ou r
thinking about beasts and animals is
infected with terminological and con
ceptual muddles. Terms such asdom
inance and aggression, for instance,
are used in ways which are neither
colloqu iallysatisfactory, norconcep
tually precise (not even in a merely
behaviou risticsense) .
One of the
cardinal conceptual sins is confusing
thefu nction ofabehaviou rwith its
goal. The question of whya behavior
w,asselected by evolution is disti net
from the question of what the hehav
iOLi r means tothebei ngin q,UJ~stion.
For 'instance, . "when a [male]harnadr
yas babQon adopts :a youngfemal,e the
eventual result may be the creation of
a'ha rem', but we h.ave no strong rea
'son to think that the baboon intends
more th'an the adoption of a ch i Id, the
becomi ngofa 'mother'" (p .84) .
The above quote illustrates another
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feature of the book:
while thought
provoking and refreshingly different,
it often do~s not go into enough detail
and depth to be quite convincing. In
this instance there is an obvious
question which cries in vain for an
answer:
why, if the adoption of a
child is the sole m()tivation, does the
male baboon adopt only female chil
dren? Perhaps there is a convincing
answer, but Ciark does not even
acknowledge the question.
Another
example of this shortcoming is found
in th.e discussion of the famous incest
taboo:
"Th~' b~n on incest ... does
not rest on the supposedly bad effects
of inbreeding :
in fact, such bad
effects a r.e rather a consequence of
th.epan th,a,n its cause-for any ha rm
ful r:ecessivegenes would be elimi
nated from the gene pool in a very
few generations of inbreeding" (p.
72).
For one thing, this leaves out
of accou nt the possible advantages of
heterozygosity, thepai ring of differ
ent 9~nes. ThJ.s may be an advantage
even when none of the genes in ques
tion i,s particularly harmful.
It is
regrettable that Clark's stimulating
idea:s and valuable insights are too
often weakened by such lack of fol
low-through.
It is not as if the book
were ,already to()long to admit of fu r
therdevelopment. While complaining,
I shou Id add that the footnotes refer
us only to particular works, not to
specific pages.
I sometimes fou nd
th is' Jrustrati ng.
"The central problem of mammals",
in Clark's analysis, "is-what to do
with the males?" (p. 74).
Various
ev.oJ,utiona ry attempts to solve this
problem, pr toga'in benefit from it,
ha\{e ,contribute9'heavilyto the devel
op~,ent of mammalian
social systems
and in particul.ar to the development
ofh"uman cultqres.
From studying
beasts we can gain insights not only
into how they organize their lives,
hut into the. possibilities for us and
the constraints upon us.
Ultimately,
Cla,r,k argues . for
a
modernized
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Aristotelian style social and political
philosophy, placing the emphasis on
small
managable
groups.
These
groups are to be small enough and
managed in such a way as to allow us
to Iive consistently with the demands
of human nature.
They are to be
largely organized around women, the
true centers of social life (a very
un-Aristotelian element).
Clark rec
recognizes that such a scheme does not
follow from pu rely biological consider-

ations.
Biology only cannot generate
ethical or political systems.
Clark
advocates his views as being consis
consistent with biology on one hand and
morality on the other.
In this book I found an array of
interesting facts, thought-provoking
arguments, and stimulating ideas.
In
spite of my stated reservations, I
warmly recommend the book as well
worth the reading.
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